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The Rise of Social Movements
Among Migrant Workers
Uncertain strivings for autonomy
Chloé Froissart
1 The reforms brought with them the Party’s retreat from certain social and economic
spheres, and what was once claimed as identical interests between the Party-state, the
working people and the enterprise administrators vanished. As Dorothy J. Solinger puts
it in a recent paper: the three parties, “once supposed allies, have become mutually
antagonistic”1.  The economic reforms hence enabled the emergence of  a new space
where social, economic and political actors have a chance to push for their interests
thanks to new conditions of bargaining as well as new alliances. According to Charles
Tilly, “social movements contribute to the creation of a public space—social settings,
separate  both  from  governing  institutions  and  from  organizations  devoted  to
production or  reproduction,  in  which consequential  deliberation over public  affairs
takes  place—as  well  as  sometimes  contributing  to  transfers  of  power  over  states”2.
Peasants were the first among the Chinese population to be put on the move by the
economic reforms: transient, no longer belonging to rural society and lacking residency
status in the urban area where they work, while more immune to social control they
are also denied full citizenship rights. This situation changed in 2002-2003 when the
central  government,  aware  both  of  the  necessity  to  acknowledge  migrant  workers’
economic contribution and afraid of growing social instability, started to call for the
protection of their “legal  rights”.  However,  as the state is  trying to regain migrant
workers’ confidence in an attempt to reassert its legitimacy, some migrants now want
autonomy. They are supported by social organisations willing to fill the gap created by
an unsupportive Party or to provide some redress against an oppressive system. This
situation  recalls  the  definition  of  social  movements  as  “a  network  of  informal
interactions between a plurality of individuals, groups and/or organizations” 3. As Tilly
reminds  us,  a  social  movement  is  not  a  group  of  a  particular  sort,  “nor  do  social
movements undergo natural  histories”4 with a starting point,  a  middle and an end.
They are rather defined as historically specific clusters of political performances. The
aim  of  this  article  is  to  determine  why  the  social  movements  that  have recently
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appeared  among  migrant  workers  emerged  at  that  specific  moment  and  how  the
historical  moment in which they arose contributed to  their  specificity.  It  will  then
further explore what it  is  that shapes the migrant workers’  social  movement in an
attempt  to  evaluate  their  impact  on  state-society  relations.  Do  migrants  challenge
established social and political values? Migrant workers are now increasingly resorting
to new forms of action and representation, but does this mean that they are emerging
as an autonomous group? 
How the Chinese state’s emerging legal discourse informs social movements
2 The  state’s  changing  discourse  towards  migrant  workers  abetted  their  political
expression of their grievances and informed the emergence of social movements.
The state’s changing policy towards migrant workers and its implementation at the
local level
3 The  years  2002-2003  symbolise  a  turning  point  in  the  attitude  of  the  Chinese
government towards migrant workers. Until then, the central government had mainly
turned a blind eye to the way urban authorities had taken advantage of the Chinese
residency system not to grant any rights to migrant workers, and had increased the
economic  and  administrative  hurdles  to  prevent  a  “blind  flood  of  migrants”
(nongminggong mangmu liudong)  into  urban areas.  In  2003  however,  a  number  of
important policies were issued by the central government that called for the protection
of migrant workers’ “legal rights”. Three main reasons explain this sudden change. The
first  reason  is  that  a  new  political  leadership  came  to  power  and  designed  new
priorities  for  national  development.  Since  the  Sixteenth  Congress  of  the  Chinese
Communist Party in November 2002, the leadership has put an emphasis on new social
policies in favour of the disenfranchised and on restoring the socio-economic balance
between rural and urban areas. It acknowledged that migrant workers’ remittances to
villages represented a vital support to the rural economy and as such needed to be
secured. The second reason for the central government’s changing attitude was the
need, since the 1990s, to tackle increasing delinquency and criminality among migrant
workers  and  to  preserve  social  order.  The  third  reason,  according  to  nationwide
surveys,  is  that  migrant  workers  already  represent  60%  of  the  workforce  in  the
secondary and tertiary sectors5. They were thus acknowledged as the “majority of the
working  class”  (gongren  de  zhulijun).  They  therefore  should  enjoy  rights
commensurate with their growing contribution to national development.
4 Following these acknowledgments, the State Council issued a decree on Successfully
Managing the Employment of Rural Workers in the Cities and their Access to Public
Services in January 2003, as well as the First Political Document6 in January 2004. Both
documents  call  for  the  eradication  of  any  kind  of  discriminative  regulations  or
practices  against  migrant  workers.  The  documents  also  request  an  equal  access  to
employment, education and public services. The central government thus insists that
the national law is universal, and should protect everyone equally, prevailing over the
administrative system—including the hukou (residency registration) system—inherited
from the Maoist period, as well as over local regulations. This claim was followed by a
demand to facilitate migrant workers’ access to state institutions, tribunals and Party
organisations in an attempt to channel their grievances into legal redress. In August
2003,  an  urgent  circular  was  issued  by  the  All  China  Federation  of  Trade  Unions
(ACFTU) to urge migrant workers to join the trade unions, a right that, in practice, they
had often been denied thus far7. Besides trying to foster local authority responsibility
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towards migrants,  the central  government launched a campaign in October 2003 to
develop  their  professional  and  legal  training,  assuming  that  the  violent  actions  by
migrants could be explained by their “backwardness” and their lack of legal culture.
5 I  will  study the case of Chengdu, the capital  of  Sichuan province,  to see how these
central  directives  were  implemented  at  the  local  level.  There,  they  were  strictly
followed.  The  provincial  government  issued  local  regulations  to  echo  them.  For
example, the Supreme Court of Sichuan issued a circular urging tribunals at every level
to  expedite  the  investigation,  the  trial  and  the  enforcement  of  court  decisions
regarding any cases involving migrant workers. It also called for the reduction or the
exemption  of  trial  fees8.  The  provincial  Labour and  Social  Security  Bureau,  the
provincial Construction Bureau and the provincial branch of the ACFTU jointly issued a
notification compelling construction companies  to  pay a  bank deposit  to  guarantee
migrant  workers’  salaries9.  The  municipal  government  also  launched  a  political
campaign highly supported by the media to raise rights awareness and knowledge of
legal  procedures  among  migrant  workers,  and  encourage  them  to  “trust  the
government, trust the law”10. Governmental institutions were portrayed as siding with
the  migrants,  settling  conflicts  free  of  charge  in  an  efficient  and  fair  manner  and
checking if  their  employers had signed labour contracts,  paid migrant salaries,  and
contributed to migrant social security11. The Sichuan branch of the ACFTU distributed a
great number of flyers to inform migrant workers of their rights, the role of the trade
unions and the different kinds of procedures (conciliation, administrative arbitration
and trial)  available to resolve labour disputes.  The central programme for the legal
training of migrant workers led to the mushrooming of training sessions organised by
governmental agencies at every level, mass organisations, social organisations and so-
called “Government Operated Non Governmental Organisations” (GONGOs)12. In 2003,
the Sichuan provincial government trained 2.1 million migrants and announced that 10
million  would  be  trained  by  2005.  Public  funding  for  this  programme  in  Sichuan
amounted to 4 million yuan in 2003 and 71 million in 200413. 
6 Local authority eagerness to follow the central directives is due to particular conditions
in the Sichuan capital. First, as more than 90% of migrant workers in Chengdu are from
Sichuan province, the municipal government’s administrative responsibility towards
Sichuanese  migrants  is  much  stronger  than  the responsibility  of  big  coastal  cities
towards migrants  from all  over China.  At  least,  the provincial  government can put
pressure on the municipality and compel it to better protect migrant workers’ rights14.
For this reason, working and living conditions for migrants have been traditionally
better in Chengdu than in big coastal cities. Second, Chengdu First Party Secretary Li
Chuncheng made the  “unification of  urban and rural  areas”  the  new motto  of  the
municipality and committed himself to bring peasants and migrants’ rights in the line
with those of urban dwellers15.
Confronting official discourse with unchanged conditions: from rights awareness to
political consciousness
7 As a  result  of  this  new policy,  rights  awareness  among migrant  workers  improved
greatly, as did their inclination to seek legal redress. Migrant workers trained in NGOs
were very satisfied with the legal knowledge they had acquired. As L, a young migrant
volunteer in a Shenzhen NGO, put it: “Only after attending the classes did I know that
overtime should be paid, that when you get hired by a company you are not supposed
to pay a deposit to your employer but you are supposed to sign a work contract with
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him”. Training also helped migrant workers to broaden their claims and to seek equal
treatment with urban or more qualified workers. In the past, complaints were mainly
about the payment of salaries, but claims now also concern social security enrolment,
holiday  or  professional  training16.  All  the  legal  aid  centres  I  surveyed17 reported  a
dramatic increase in the number of migrants seeking advice on how to take legal action
against their employers. 
8 Despite a nationwide political campaign, the protection of migrant workers’ rights did
not,  in  fact,  improve  dramatically.  According  to  workers’  statements,  working
conditions in factories did not change: unpaid salaries, long-unpaid overtime, lack of
respect for security norms, frequent industrial accidents, absence of social security or
support from the employer in case of injuries at work or diseases contracted within a
work environment are still the lot of migrant workers18. Likewise, many workers still
complain  about  being  forced  to  rush  from  one  review  office  to  another  and  the
difficulty  of  getting  cases  accepted  due  to  the  collusion  between  authorities  and
entrepreneurs. Delays in trial or enforcement of court decisions as well as arbitrary and
steep procedural fees are also subjects of contention. Some workers still do not dare
sue their employer for fear of losing their jobs or other forms of reprisal19. There are
still  cases  of  migrants  who  have  been  physically  abused20 or  even  murdered 21 for
seeking salary compensation. In August 2004, a year and a half after the launching of
the first political campaign to clear back pay, Vice-Premier Zeng Peiyan revealed that
more than 360 billion yuan in unpaid wages remained owed to migrant workers22. As a
result, Chinese and foreign media are still regularly reporting on migrants committing
suicide by jumping from the towers they helped to build23, by blowing themselves up24
or by self-immolation25. Mass riots have also recently increased in scope, violence and
duration.
9 In the short term, the revised discourse of the Chinese leadership had a positive impact.
It appears to show the state and the Party siding with the workers, sharing the same
interests and fighting against the illegal practices of entrepreneurs or corrupt local
officials.  What  is  under  attack  are  individuals  not  the  system.  Indeed,  the  populist
tactics of China’s new leaders, the political campaigns in 2003 and 2004 to help migrant
workers claim back their overdue wages and the thundering announcements of the
billions of yuan that have been paid back to them have had quite a strong symbolic
impact over migrants. At first, they were thankful for this public acknowledgment of
the legitimacy of their claims. In December 2003, the Peking municipality supported a
show trial against a construction company that owed over 5 million yuan to a 500-
strong migrant worker team, but the court decision was difficult to enforce since the
company did not  have enough money to pay the wages26.  As  a  migrant  who was a
member of the worker team reported to central television: “It’s such an honour for us
that the government is paying attention to our case, whether we get the money back or
not, the most important thing is that the authorities are on our side”27. 
10 But when migrant workers come to understand that  government practice does not
match official policies and that political campaigns make little change in their daily life,
they start to question the state’s legitimacy, as shown by the following quotes28: 
11 “Newspapers  spent  their  time  reporting  that  migrants’  salaries  must  achieve  the
minimum wage,  the government also says that  supervision should be reinforced to
check illegal practices such as no back pay or overtime, but it’s very hard to implement.
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Once out, a newspaper is already out of date and the government doesn’t stick to its
word—why?”29.
12 “What matters is not that there is no law to rely on, but that the law is not reliable, its
implementation is not strict and infringements have no limits”30. 
13 The opening of state institutions, courts and Party organisations to migrant workers
enabled them to experience in an unprecedented way their contention with the state,
which claims for the first time to serve them. Some migrants no longer explain their
contention with the authorities by their specific status as unwanted guests in the cities,
but  by  the  failings  of  the  political  system that  affect  them as  well  as  other  social
categories who lack both the economic and social capital to get round these failures.
Migrants are experiencing a paradoxical situation where their rights,  acknowledged
both by the law and the state’s policy statements, are not guaranteed, yet the discourse
of the central authorities gives them new incentive and the possibility of expressing
their claims. As in Western countries,  social movements in China can be defined in
terms of the challenges they pose to established norms and values31. The difference in
China is that the law is mobilised to question social codes and practices that commonly
occur and are made possible by China’s institutional system. 
Challenging the discourse of the Party-state
14 As James C. Scott recalls, the very basis on which claims to legitimacy are advanced
provides “the raw material for contradictions and conflicts”32 in a society: “the very
process of attempting to legitimate a social order by idealizing it… provides its subjects
with the means, the symbolic tools, the very ideas for a critique… For most purposes,
then, it is not at all necessary for subordinate classes to set foot outside the confines of
the ruling ideals in order to formulate a critique of power”33. This is particularly true in
the  Chinese  case  where  strongly  oppressive  regimes  always  deterred  people  from
directly confronting the political system. During the Cultural Revolution, some factions
of the Red Guards effectively opposed the Maoist regime while apparently endorsing
the official revolutionary ideals. They were denounced as the ones who were “using the
red flag to fight the red flag”34. The same tactics are still used today by migrants who
turn  back  the  official  discourse  against  the  state.  As  we  saw  previously,  the  new
leadership’s  populist  tactics  aim  to  regain  migrant  workers’  confidence  in  the
government’s capacity to preserve social order and to rule with benevolence. These
are,  as recalled by Vivienne Shue35,  two main grounds on which the CCP claims its
legitimacy. Migrants’ repertoire of contention refers to the same values held by the
state that are either questioned or reassessed in an attempt to compel authorities to
comply with them. Facing difficulties in suing their employers,  migrants would,  for
example, refer to the law they thought was infringed and say “Why doesn’t it apply to
us? Aren’t we citizens of the People’s Republic of China?”, and “We’re making a great
contribution to national development, our rights should be protected”, or “I respect
the society where I live and work, I expect it to respect me in return”.
15 A strike that was successfully carried out in a Shenzhen factory in October 2004 is an
example of how migrants are putting the state to the test. This example shows how
migrants  refer  to  the  law  both  to  try  to  rally  local  officials  against  the  factory
management and to put pressure on the authorities so that they enforce the law they
promulgated. A month after the strike broke up, I went to Hai Yan Electronic Plant, a
Hong Kong-Guangzhou joint-venture manufacturing electronic components, to gather
worker testimonies.  In this  factory,  the workers were paid 240 yuan monthly for a
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regular working day of 12 hours, and 15 hours during peak times, seven days a week.
Since the fixed salary was very low, they regularly did overtime, although it was paid
only 2 yuan an hour. Workers had also to pay for their accommodation and food. There
was  no  trade  union  branch  in  the  factory,  and  none  of  the  complaints  lodged  by
workers to the management and government offices were accepted. Workers resigned
themselves to this impasse until the day they found that the Shenzhen municipality
government  had  fixed  the  monthly  minimum  wage  at  610  yuan.  The  news  spread
quickly. The workers decided to organise collective action and printed flyers that were
posted in the dormitories as well as distributed by hand. Three thousand workers went
on strike on October 6th for one day and a half, and the morning of the second day,
they took to the streets and blocked the main highway linking Shenzhen to Hong Kong
for  four  hours  in  an  attempt  to  push  the  government  to  intervene.  They  were
successful.  Although  the  demonstrators  were  forced  back  to  the  factory  by  armed
policemen, officials from the municipal and district Labour and Social Security Bureaus
held negotiations with workers’  representatives and both managements from China
and Hong Kong and were  compelled  to  enforce  the  legal  minimum wage.  Workers
obtained a 170% increase on their salaries. Overtime is now paid 5.4 yuan per hour from
Monday to Friday and 7.2 yuan per hour on weekends and national holidays, and is
limited to 40 hours a month. Finally, the management has to contribute to workers’
social security. 
16 The main reason why this strike was successful was its wide coverage by the local press.
It  was  the  Guangzhou  press,  especially  the  outspoken  Nanfang  Dushibao  that  first
reported the demonstration and hence forced Shenzhen newspapers to mention it. As
the latter  are directly under the control  of  Shenzhen authorities,  they were rather
scathing  about  the  strike,  and  denounced  it  as  an  illegal  action  inducing  social
disorder36.  But  the  Nanfang  Dushibao  sided  with  the  workers  and  pointed  to  local
authority responsibility in the demonstration: since the complaints lodged by workers
in the past had been rejected, there was nothing left but to take to the streets37. Chinese
media  are  now  increasingly  reporting  on  strikes,  and  whether  the  reports  are
sympathetic  to  the workers  or  not,  they put  pressure on local  authorities  to  settle
disputes38.  The  press  reports  led  to  many  postings  on  the  Internet,  most  of  them
accusing  the  local  authorities  of  failing  in  their  duty  and to  support  the  workers’
collective action 39. Local NGOs also supported the migrants. One of them, the Shenzhen
Institute  of  Contemporary  Observation,  explained  to  the  local  authorities  that  if
workers had taken to the streets, it was not to create social disorder but to express
legitimate  claims40.  This  pressure  obliged  the  police  to  free  the  two leaders  of  the
demonstration arrested two weeks before, and the labour authorities imposed a record
fine of nearly 2 million yuan on the factory management, thus enacting an exemplary
punishment41. 
17 The economic context was also favourable to the successful resolution of the strike. The
Pearl River Delta had been suffering since March-April 2004 from a workforce shortage
that local authorities had recently publicly acknowledged. Since the media frequently
related  this  shortage  to  bad  working  and  living  conditions  in  the  factories,  local
authorities were forced to take measures to better protect migrant workers’  rights.
They also had to face the pressure of foreign companies and joint ventures worried
about their public image who were seeking to enforce the “corporate codes of conduct”
in the Chinese factories that produced their goods42. The Hong-Kong based Computime
Ltd was indeed favourably disposed to increase the salaries and had encouraged in the
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past its Chinese counterpart to do so, but the later was reluctant to comply. As a result,
the Hong Kong party was allowed to participate in the factory social management after
the strike43. The Shenzhen authorities were thus forced to change their tactic to attract
foreign  investments  and  companies:  whereas  they  had  previously  depended  on  an
abundant cheap labour, they now had to make the most of social stability and economic
efficiency. 
18 The Hai Yan factory strike was successful thanks to connections and alliances between
different  social  actors  supporting  the  same  values.  These connections  were  made
possible by the fact that, in this particular case, local authorities and social actors were
to some extent sharing the same interests (economic development, social order). This
strike illustrates Tilly’s definition of social movements as the shaping of a public space
where a consequential debate over public affairs takes place, although the public space
in  the  Chinese  context  can  exist  only  under  certain  circumstances  and  is  not
institutionalised. This strike is thus a good example of the emergence of a new, and
previously unacceptable, cluster of performances that marks the definitive appearance
of the social movement as an available means of contention44.
19 If this case shows that migrants attempt to both rally authorities and force them to
shoulder their responsibility, there are also examples of growing distrust of the Party-
state among migrant workers who now seek support outside the Party framework. 
Growing distrust of the Party-state and the quest for new forms of representationTrade
unions as illegitimate means of representation
20 In  Sichuan,  the  growing  distrust  of  the  Party-state  is  clearly  demonstrated  by  the
failure of official trade unions to attract migrant workers. As we have mentioned above,
the ACFTU waged a nationwide campaign in 2003 for urging migrant workers to join
trade unions. Starting from 2004, the Sichuan branch of the ACFTU was prompted to act
by a series of tragic incidents involving migrant workers. The ACFTU placed concerted
efforts  in  attracting  migrants  to  trade  unions  especially  designed  for  them.  Their
objectives are the following. First, provide migrant workers with professional and legal
training;  channel  and  control  migration.  Second,  protect  migrant  workers’  rights
outside  their  place  of  origin  by  creating  a  network  between  scattered  Sichuanese
migrants and the trade unions in their villages on the one hand, and between the trade
unions in the place of origin and the urban trade unions on the other hand. The aim
was to fight the “local protectionism” of urban trade unions not receiving migrants’
complaints in order to protect local economic interests. Third, strengthen migrants’
attachment to the Party by persuading them that they are unable to defend their rights
independently45. 
21 Two  union  branches  were  created  for  migrants  in  2004,  one  in  July  in  Pengzhou
municipality  Danjing  township,  40km north  of  Chengdu and one  in  October  in  the
migrants’  labour  market  in  Chengdu:  both  are  patent  failures.  Two-thirds  of  the
population of Danjing township are farmers and 1,300 peasants are officially seeking
jobs outside their native villages every year. The union was founded just after a conflict
over unpaid salaries involving migrants from Danjing in north Xinjiang, which cost one
of them his life. Union officials informed the Party secretaries and the village heads,
and asked them to mobilise the peasants to attend a meeting to introduce to them the
trade  union.  Despite  the  political  campaign,  only  a  hundred  people  attended  the
meeting and 21 became union members. When I went to survey the union situation in
November  2004,  members  only  numbered  82,  although  membership  was  free.
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According to a high-ranking official from the Department of Female Workers of the
Sichuan Province General Trade Union, when officials went to the villages to introduce
the union to migrants and recruit members, peasants thought they wanted to kidnap
them and sell them in Xinjiang! As explained by this official: “Migrant workers have so
many experiences of being cheated that they don’t trust any [state] organisation that
want to help them”46. 
22 Migrants still have good reasons not to trust official organisations. In Danjing, I met a
worker  who came to  the  union building  to  seek  conciliation  in  a  conflict  with  his
employer over a work accident. He was working in a mine that collapsed over him and
had been classified as ninth-degree handicapped47. His employer paid for part of the
medical fees, but he himself had to pay for his nursing, accommodation and food in
hospital, for which he was seeking reimbursement as well as the payment of his injury
compensation.  According  to  the  Regulations  on  Industrial  Accident  Insurance48,  he
should  have  received  20,000  yuan  compensation,  plus  other  reimbursements.  But
during the conciliation meeting held the following day in the presence of the worker,
his employer and the trade union representative, the latter offered the migrant 8,000
yuan, telling him that if he went to an administrative arbitration organ or to court to
seek legal redress, his complaint would not be received. This example shows collusion
between  trade  unions  and  entrepreneurs  (from  which  the  trade  union  often  takes
bribes), and between trade unions and legal organs. This also explains why workers,
whether urban or rural, do not trust them.
23 In the Chengdu migrant workers labour market, the situation was even more desperate:
only one month after its foundation, the trade union branch had already been closed49.
Migrants were scathing about the union: “No point to seek trade unions’ help. They
take your money and run”, “Trade unions serve the capital, not the people”, “Trade
unions are full of conmen, and they never settle conflicts” were widespread statements.
Migrant hostility towards the trade union can be explained by the specific situation of
the labour market, which is under the jurisdiction of the urban district government but
in reality functions on a purely private and mercantile logic, a situation the market
administration  takes  advantage  of.  Huge  amounts  of  money  are  extorted  by  the
employment agencies from the workers who cannot find proper jobs. Hence, migrant
workers equate the trade union with the administration and the private agencies. But
they also remember their experience in the cities, where they were often subject to
arbitrary official extortion. Some did not believe in the longevity of the effects of the
leadership’s new policy that put an end to arbitrary raids and detentions and lowered
the price of the various permits that migrant workers have to purchase to live and
work in the cities. Others said about the campaign on back pay clearance: “It is not
enough to issue new policies, they have to be enforced”. During this interview, migrant
workers  were  clearly  questioning  the  Chinese  political  system  and  the  Party’s
legitimacy by denying their capacity to protect their rights, govern with benevolence
and preserve social order. This situation already led some migrants to seek support
from so called “non governmental organisations” founded and run by urban people, or
even to create their own organisations.
New forms of representation within the political system 
24 Social  organisations have developed in China these past  few years,  providing social
services that the Party and the state did not want to or could not provide at first. The
ones  devoted  to  serving  migrants  offer  a  social  space  to  isolated  workers,  also
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professional and legal training, general and health education and advice on life in the
city.  They also provide legal  aid and offer  free conciliation services.  They facilitate
migrants’  access  to  administrative  arbitration  and  tribunals  by  giving  procedural
advice,  helping build up a judicial  record,  providing free or low-rate legal  services.
These organisations operate as a substitute of distrusted official trade unions. More and
more migrants are seeking their help or are working for them as volunteers during
their free time. Many workers admitted that they would never have obtained or even
sought legal redress without the help of these organisations. Hence, these groups force
public  institutions  to  take  workers’  grievances  into  account  and  they  also  try  to
influence public policies by submitting reports to the state or organising consultative
conferences.
25 The state had to acknowledge the growing influence of these organisations by issuing
and  regularly  reviewing  regulations  concerning  NGOs.  Paradoxically,  as  the
regulations50 stipulate that to be registered with the Ministry of Civil Affairs as an NGO,
an  organisation  has  to  be  sponsored  by  a  state  organ,  very  few  organisations  are
granted  official  status  and  the  ones  that  are  cannot  be  considered  as  truly  non-
governmental.  Three kinds of  organisations can be distinguished according to their
degree of autonomy as well as their work and political orientation. 
26 First, the Government Operated Non-Governmental Organisations (GONGOs). Initiated
by a state organ that supervises them, they have legal status and receive public funds.
They thus can be considered an extension of the state. Indeed, they do not differ much
from state agencies that channel migrations and recruitments and train the migrants.
GONGOs mainly focus on improving migrant workers’ economic and so-called “legal
rights” in the framework designed by the Communist Party. I surveyed two of them.
One,  located  in  Chengdu,  is  called  West  China  Sichuan  Relief  Centre  for  Migrant
Workers (Sichuan Huaxi nongmingong qiuzhu zhongxin), and was founded in 2003 by
one of the leaders of the provincial government agency for the development of the
workforce linked to the Sichuan Province Bureau of Agriculture. It clearly acts as a
trade  union:  it  directly  intervenes  with  employers  and  local  authorities  to  settle
disputes involving Sichuanese migrants. It also compensates for migrant workers’ lack
of  social  security  by  granting  them  a  lump  sum  in  case  of  emergency  or  in
compensation to disability related to an industrial accident. The other, in Peking, is
called the Migrant Women’s Club (Dagongmei zhi jia). It was founded in 1996 by the
chief editor of the National Federation of Women’s publishing house and is supported
by  a  famous  representative  of  the  Peking  Municipality  People’s  Congress  who  is  a
member of its management committee. However, this organisation is growing more
independent  in  its  funding  sources  and  initiated  advocacy  meetings  attended  by
academic specialists, social workers, representatives of migrant workers, high-ranking
officials and cadres of mass organisations, to discuss the possibilities of improving state
policies for migrant workers.
27 Second,  the  NGOs  set  up  by  urban  residents  and  not  directly  related  to  a  state
organisation,  although  they  often  have  many  governmental  connections.  Beijing
Facilitator (Beijing xiezuozhe) is one of those. It is registered as an enterprise with the
municipal  Bureau  of  Industry  and  Commerce  and  is  entirely  financed  by  foreign
organisations. It was founded in 2003 by two defectors from Migrant Women’s Club
who wanted to promote a more democratic organisation relying to a greater extent on
migrants’  active  and  direct  participation.  Beijing  Facilitator  aims  to  foster  class
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consciousness by organising activities in small groups led by migrant volunteers who
share experiences, analyse the difficulties they face in the city, and promote solidarity
among  migrants.  This  organisation  claims  to  be  closer  to  the  people  and  more
legitimate  as  its  founders  do  not  have  a  Peking hukou and as  part  of  their  family
members are from the countryside. It also claims to be more involved in promoting
“civil society” by influencing public policies than the previous one. However, because
of both political constraints –especially the necessity to secure an uncertain status- and
its cultural heritage this organisation also appears to some extent as a transmission
belt of the Party-state, fostering official ideology among migrant workers and exerting
a kind of social control over them51.
28 Third,  NGOs run by migrant  workers  who think that  migrants  should only  rely  on
themselves to defend their rights. They are registered as enterprises with the Bureau of
Industry  and  Commerce  and  are  exclusively  financed  by  foreign  NGOs.  The  more
radical organisation we met is located in Shenzhen. Its leader is quite sceptical about
the previous organisations that “do not promote autonomous development of migrant
workers as a group.”52.  He views these organisations as “Counsellors to the Prince”
beholden to the state and as illegitimate representatives (being urban, non elected,
close to power) of a population deprived of any direct means of political expression.
According to his  point of  view, trying to orientate reforms by advising the state is
tantamount to acknowledging its legitimacy and the legitimacy of the current system
as a whole. The organisation mainly spreads legal and job security information among
workers, and provides assistance to those who want to lodge complaints against or sue
their employer. But the ultimate aim of this association is to help migrant workers
gradually  unite  and  organise  to  eventually  change  the  political  system  through
collective  actions.  This  kind of  radicalism is  closely  linked to  the characteristics  of
Shenzhen,  which  is  far  away  from  the  Centre  and  where  migrant  workers  are
concentrated in industrial districts, thus having little connection with the local urban
population. Workers in Shenzhen generally join labour organisations because they are
aggrieved  and eager  to  defend their  rights,  whereas  many members  of  the  Peking
organisations mentioned above are employed in the service sector and are also looking
for a place of sociability and an opportunity to improve their general knowledge. More
importantly,  migrants’  NGOs  in  Shenzhen  have  close  relations  with  foreign  labour
groups, especially the ones based in Hong Kong that act as counsellors and supervisors
to these organisations.
29 However, as NGOs run by migrant workers are politically very sensitive and are even
more likely than other organisations to be banned at any time, they often have no
choice but to agree to some kind of collaboration with the state. This is the case of The
Home of Fellow Peasants (Nongyou zhi jia), a Peking-based organisation more oriented
towards  pedagogic  and  cultural  activities,  whose  leader  was  elected  “Nationally
outstanding young migrant worker” in May 2005 because he had given information to
state organs about migrant workers. This is a good example of how the Party tries to
co-opt activists that otherwise might become dissidents,  by giving them the feeling
they can act more efficiently if they contribute to reform the system from inside53. The
deal is the following: relative security is granted to these organisations as long as they
accept to side with the government.
30 There is hence growing rights awareness among migrant workers that sometimes can
give  birth  to  political  consciousness;  but  this  political  consciousness  is  still  hardly
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translated  into  an  increased  autonomy  for  society.  So-called  NGOs,  also  officially
labelled “third sector”, offer migrant workers services that the state does not provide
for lack of resources or lack of will. They fill the gap in the political system without
opposing it,  thus contributing to perpetuating the status quo.  This  is  the extent to
which Chinese social movements fail to match Tilly’s definition. First, our study of the
third sector reveals that the delegation of Party-state responsibilities to the NGOs does
not give rise to the empowerment of the society. Second, NGO’s advocacy commitment
shows the limits of their political demand and their lack of strategy to overcome this
collaboration pattern and shift the power balance in favour of society. At least one NGO
is  already  aware  of  these  limits,  but  its  ability  to  induce  a  new  political  dynamic
appears  in  itself  limited.  First,  it  is  not  self-reliant  and  admits  the  difficulty  of
mobilising  migrant  workers  on  a  sustained  basis.  Second,  given  the  political
constraints,  it  also  subscribes  to  the  idea  of  reforming  the  system from inside.  Its
strategy mainly consists in encouraging migrants to sue their employers as a way to
boost  workers’  legal  training and add pressure on the authorities.  Third,  it  is  very
reluctant to establish connections with other organisations.  There are supposedly a
couple of migrants’ NGOs in the Pearl River Delta. They know each other since the same
foreign foundations support them but they are reluctant to unite, knowing that it is the
surest way to be suppressed.
31 Social  movements  among  migrant  workers  in  China  emerged  because  of  the
contradictions of the state that wanted to preserve social order without consenting to
core political reforms. Rights awareness among migrants was at first encouraged by the
central government, which urged state organisations to protect migrants’ rights and
foster their legal training. The recourse to legal procedure fostered individualisation
but maintains conflict in the private sphere: which is why it was allowed by the regime.
However,  this  is  the  phase  during  which  migrants  fully  experienced  their
disempowerment and the failings of the system. Confronting this failure revealed the
necessity  of  reforms and the  need to  find alternative  forms of  redress  outside  the
Party-state.  The Chinese state’s  efforts to maintain social  order and regain migrant
confidence thus provided for the emergence of social movements, and gave them their
rhetorical  content.  A new form of  mediation and representation,  such as  the NGOs
discussed above, appeared for the first time. These organisations are already playing
the role of public organs, such as trade unions, lobbying the authorities in the name of
migrants  to  foster  the  guarantee  of  their  rights.  But  these  organisations,  whose
autonomy is  not institutionalised,  face difficulties  promoting alternative values and
prevent to some extent the emergence of disgruntled migrants as an autonomous actor
capable of contributing to political life. NGOs are thus also working for the benefit of
the Party-state, to which they adhere, minimising social conflict and orienting reforms
in a direction that can help the Party to maintain its power. While an integral part of
the social movement of migrant workers, these organisations also delimit this social
movement  in  their  own way.  These  delimitations  are  why some migrants  question
these NGOs’ legitimacy to represent them―which might be migrant workers’ first step
towards a more assertive and autonomous stand.
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RÉSUMÉS
Over the past few years, as conflicts involving migrant workers have become more and more
frequent, the Chinese state has called for the protection of their rights, but with the effect of
abetting the rise of social movements. New statements made by the state legitimated migrants’
claims. More aware of their rights, migrants, as never before gradually became attuned to their
relationship to  the  political  system.  While  the state  is  now increasing their  access  to  public
institutions and party organisations, migrants deem these measures inefficient, and the result is
demonstrations or new forms of mediation and representation. Yet this development does not
represent a significant change in state-society relations. 
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